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TRIBUTE TO JUDGE BETTY BINNS FLETCHER
Judge William A. Fletcher∗
Thank you very much for the invitation to introduce this wonderful
symposium honoring my mother, Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.
Let me begin by thanking my mother. Without her I would not be
here. I realize that everyone can, and should, thank their mother for
being here—that is, for their very existence. But I mean my thanks not
only in that way. I mean also that without her I really would not be
here—at this podium, speaking to you as a judge on the Ninth Circuit.
Many of you know the outlines of the story. When President Clinton
nominated me to the Ninth Circuit in the spring of 1995, we all thought
it would be a wonderful thing to have a mother and a son on the same
court. We did not dream that having two members of the same family as
judicial colleagues would pose a problem. After all, Morris Arnold,
nominated by the first President Bush, had just joined his brother,
Richard, as a judge on the Eighth Circuit. And the Hand cousins,
Learned and Augustus, had sat together for years on the Second Circuit.
Which reminds me of a saying about the Hands. You first have to know
that Learned’s nickname was “B.” The saying went: “Quote ‘B’”—that
is, Learned—“but follow Gus.” If you wonder how that should be
applied on the Ninth Circuit, it is “Quote ‘B’”—that is, Betty—“and
follow her, too.”
But the Republicans were not to be easily shamed into doing the right
thing. They had celebrated the fact that Morris Arnold had joined his
brother on the bench. But now, claiming that an ancient anti-nepotism
statute (which predated the Hands on the Second Circuit) forbade family
members sitting on the same court, they stalled my nomination. This
went on for several years. I said “years.” Mom—I hope you don’t mind
me calling her “Mom”—broke the stalemate. In return for my
confirmation, she agreed to take senior status, thereby freeing up her seat
for a new appointment to be filled by President Clinton, but with a
person acceptable to the Republican then-Senator from Washington.
The Republicans got themselves a deal, but it was not quite as good a
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deal as they thought. Most judges who take senior status relax a little.
They sit part time, they don’t do capital cases, they don’t sit outside their
home city, they don’t do screening or motions, or some combination of
the above. In other words, they are less than full-time judges. Mom, as I
do not need to tell you—and if the Republicans had asked, as someone
might have told them—was not likely to follow that path.
Mom has now been on senior status for ten years. For all of those
years, she has carried a full load of argued cases, she has done capital
cases, she has traveled to hear cases in other cities, and she has done
screening and motions. Further, Mom calls cases en banc (and gets her
cases called en banc) with some regularity. She would hardly be doing
her job if she did not decide cases that get called en banc. And, as if
doing her job in the Ninth Circuit is not enough, she has sat by
designation on other circuits, taking her sense of justice to other parts of
the country that may be in need of same. Finally, and there will be more
on this point in a moment, she has had a distinguished record of
reversals by the United States Supreme Court.
If I could come close to fooling myself when I was confirmed, I have
no illusions now. Left to her own devices, Mom would not have taken
senior status ten years ago. She would not have taken senior status last
week. She would be an active status judge today, junior only to the Chief
Judge and one other judge. I am the beneficiary of her sacrifice, and I
want to say here, “Thank you.”
As most of you know, Mom is a proud graduate of the University of
Washington School of Law. She started law school at Stanford, where
she was an undergraduate, during the War. For some of you in the
audience, I mean the Second World War. Stanford’s law school had
emptied out as its young men went off to war. So it invited
undergraduates, including women, to take classes. Mom’s father, himself
a lawyer, loved to tell the story of his Betty coming home for Christmas,
getting off the train in Tacoma, saying “Daddy, I got an A in Torts.” I
don’t know if this is a true story. But I do know that he loved to tell it.
Mom and Dad were married early in the war. Dad flew antisubmarine blimps out of Lakehurst, New Jersey, so they were together
for the duration. They had two children, my sister Susan and me, before
the war ended. They had two more, my sister Kathy and my brother
Paul, after they returned to the Northwest. With four children at home
and nothing else to do, Mom decided to go back to law school. Her
parents rented out their house and moved in with us. Dad and Granddad
went to work every morning. Grandmom stayed home and took care of
us kids. And Mom made the long commute to Seattle every day from
Lakewood, south of Tacoma, on old (even then it was old) Highway 99.
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Mom graduated number one in her class and could not find a job.
Finally, Charles Horowitz of the old Preston firm (now, after many name
changes, K & L Gates) took a chance on her. He knew she would be a
good lawyer. The chance he took was that he could persuade his
partners, and his clients, that she would be. Some of you in the audience
know Mom from her days in practice. You can testify that it did not take
long for everybody to know that she would be, and soon was, a superb
lawyer. I remember Bill Dwyer, later a federal judge himself, speaking
at Mom’s swearing in as a judge on the Ninth Circuit. He recounted a
case they had worked on together through most of the night. They were
all exhausted. Mom, who had been working in another room, came in—
in Bill’s words (and I remember them exactly) “fresh as a daisy, ready to
go another round.” When Charles Horowitz left the firm to take the
bench, he bequeathed his clients to Mom, including our native son
William O. Douglas. I don’t think I am violating the attorney-client
privilege when I say that Mom has always said that Justice Douglas,
who could be demanding in his role as a Justice, was a wonderful client.
When President Carter came to the White House, he changed the
system of choosing judges for the federal courts of appeals. Previously,
senators had taken the initiative in choosing federal judges for their own
states, subject to the President’s potential veto. President Carter reversed
the presumption for court of appeals judges. Through what he called
“merit selection panels,” his White House took the initiative in choosing
court of appeals judges, subject to the senators’ potential veto. At first
blush, this would seem to be a change that would have benefitted Mom.
But the kicker was that under the old system Senator Magnuson was
already prepared to propose her name to the President. Now she had to
go through the new “merit selection panel.” “Merit,” phooey! She had
had it wired. Fortunately, President Carter’s idea of merit matched
Senator Magnuson’s. And we have been blessed with Judge Betty Binns
Fletcher as a judge on the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for the
past thirty years.
No judge knows, or can know, beforehand precisely what kind of a
job he or she is taking. What is it like to be an appellate judge? Perhaps I
can best sum it up with a line from Matthew Arnold’s famous poem,
“Dover Beach.” Justice Rehnquist, later Chief Justice, once quoted from
“Dover Beach” (in the Northern Pipeline1 case if you want to know), but
he quoted from the line about the “darkling plain . . . where ignorant

1. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 91 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
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armies clash by night.”2 He said that this was Justice White’s view of the
judicial process; it is possible, however, that he was also describing his
own. But I am thinking of another line, one that describes the cases that
keep coming in, like waves on a beach.
A full-time judge will hear perhaps 250 argued cases in a year,
perhaps 300 or 400 screening cases, another 200 or so Certificates of
Appealability in habeas cases, and perhaps 200 or 300 motions. In
everything except the argued cases, the judges do their job out of the
public view. In all of these cases, argued and otherwise, the judges see a
trail of human misery. Some of it is inflicted by the criminal defendants
whose appeals we hear. Some of it has previously been inflicted on the
criminal defendants by their families. Some of it is inflicted by our harsh
sentencing laws, which on average imprison our citizens eight times
longer than do those of Western Europe for comparable crimes.3 Some
of it is inflicted by our immigration laws that are designed to keep
economic refugees out of the country (unless they can get an H-1B visa).
Some of it, particularly in the bankruptcy cases, is inflicted by a bad
economy. Some of it is entirely self-inflicted. But, however caused, we
see a lot of misery. This is true by definition. Happy people tend not to
file lawsuits.
About a month ago, Mom was in my chambers in San Francisco
talking to one of my former clerks. She said, and her words struck me,
“This job breaks your heart.”
In “Dover Beach,” Matthew Arnold is looking out at the ocean:
Listen! you hear the grating roar
Of pebbles which the waves draw back, and fling,
At their return, up the high strand,
Begin, and cease, and then again begin,
With tremulous cadence slow, and bring
The eternal note of sadness in.4
The only way in which this does not capture our reality is that our
cases—our waves on the beach—do not come with a “cadence slow.”
They come quickly, one after the other, in rapid and unremitting
succession, but always bringing “the eternal note of sadness in.”
That is the nature of the job, dealing with these cases of human
2. MATTHEW ARNOLD, Dover Beach, in THE POEMS OF MATTHEW ARNOLD 253, 255 (Miriam
Allot ed., 2d ed. Longmans 1979) (1867).
3. James E. Felman, The State of the Sentencing Union: A Call for Fundamental Reexamination,
20 FED. SENT’G REP. 337, 337 (2008).
4. ARNOLD, supra note 2, at 255.
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unhappiness, one after another, applying the law and trying to do justice.
How does Mom do the job? Until I had sat on the court with her, I had
only the vaguest idea.
First, let me describe the job that is invisible to the general public—
which, in terms of hours spent, is most of it. Here are some, but only
some, parts of this invisible job.
Screening cases are perhaps the most difficult. These are supposed to
be the easiest cases, and we have diverted them to what we call
screening for quick processing, but the job is not easy. The staff
attorneys present the cases to three judges sitting at a table (or
sometimes appearing by video), without the parties’ lawyers present. We
listen to the staff attorneys’ presentations, skim the briefs or record
excerpts, ask questions, and decide the cases—sometimes as many as ten
an hour. This could be the very definition of hell. It is boring, and you
have to pay attention.
We live in fear of making a mistake. It is easy to pay attention
between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. Usually we break for lunch; sometimes we
keep hearing cases even as we eat. At about 3 p.m. they bring us
cookies. I think this is in lieu of a pay raise. Between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m.,
we struggle to stay focused.
Mom is one of the best screeners among us, perhaps the very best.
Indeed, the staff attorneys who present screening cases have a phrase
specially reserved for her. I won’t say that she terrifies the staff
attorneys. But I will say that they come before her particularly well
prepared. Their term is that they are “Fletcher-ready,” meaning they are
ready for any question—and I mean any question—about the case they
are presenting.
Another part of the invisible job is processing PFRs (petitions for
rehearing) and PFREBs (petitions for rehearing en banc). As I don’t
need to tell the former clerks in this room, Mom pays attention to all of
them. She is one of the few judges on the Ninth Circuit who will take the
trouble, in a case that has been decided by an unpublished memorandum
disposition, to write to the panel because something in the PFR or
PFREB has caught her eye, and she thinks the panel may have made a
mistake.
Another part is making and defending against en banc calls. Nothing
in our job description says that we have to call each other’s cases en
banc. Some judges on the Ninth Circuit never, or virtually never, do so.
Some of them don’t do so based on principle. Essentially, the principle is
that if the panel made a mistake, let the Supreme Court correct it (as that
Court has occasionally been willing to do). But there is another factor at
work, which for some people may rise to the level of principle. Writing
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memos in support of en banc calls is hard work. Again, as I do not need
to tell the former clerks in the room, Mom has never been afraid of hard
work, or of calling cases en banc.
Defending against en banc calls is a slightly different proposition.
Here, the judge whose decision is being called en banc in one sense does
not have a choice. If another judge calls her case en banc, she has to
respond. In another sense, however, perhaps the judge has (or at an
earlier point, had) a choice. There are lots of ways to duck hard
questions. Sometimes a judge decides a potentially avoidable hard
question knowing that an en banc call is likely to follow. Mom is
fearless. If she thinks a hard question needs to be answered, she will
answer it. And if the right answer, in her view, is one that will provoke
an en banc call, her attitude is, in the French phrase, “tant pis”—which,
roughly translated, means “damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead.”
Second, what about the publicly visible part of the job—the published
opinions. So much to say and so little time to say it. Fortunately, most of
the rest of the day will be devoted to this topic, so I will not undertake
anything like a systematic survey of her opinions. I will touch on only
three.
About a month ago, I asked Mom to send me a list of some of her
favorite opinions. She did, accompanied by the following wry comment:
“No surprise—my favorite opinions were often reversed by the Supreme
Court.” To some extent, this is a typical comment by a trial judge or
intermediate appellate judge. None of us likes to get reversed, and we all
remember Justice Jackson’s famous comment about the Supreme Court
in Brown v. Allen, “We are not final because we are infallible, but
infallible only because we are final.”5 My old boss, Judge Stanley
Weigel of the federal district court in San Francisco, had a stock line. He
loved to say, “I just got affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, but I still think
I’m right.”
But there is something more than stubbornness and pride of
authorship in Mom’s comment. Over the past thirty years, the Supreme
Court has moved to the right, dragging some of the lower courts along
with it. The important point is not only that the Supreme Court has
reversed lower court decisions with which it disagrees. It is also that the
Supreme Court has reversed lower court decisions that were based on
earlier Supreme Court decisions with which the current Supreme Court
now disagrees.
I will start with an opinion from the good old days, or at least the

5. 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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relatively good old days, Johnson v. Transportation Agency6 decided by
the Ninth Circuit in 1984. The Transportation Agency had a voluntary
affirmative action plan that gave some preference in hiring to women
and minorities who were underrepresented in its work force. Diane
Joyce, a current employee of the agency, applied for a position as road
dispatcher, a so-called “skilled craft” position. Along with six others, she
qualified for the position by scoring above 70 on an oral examination
given by a two-person board. She scored 72.5, fourth among the seven.
Another current employee, Paul Johnson, scored 75, tied for second. The
seven applicants were given a second oral examination, now by a
differently composed board. The second board unanimously
recommended Joyce. The agency’s affirmative action coordinator then
recommended Joyce. After the Director appointed Joyce, Paul Johnson
sued under Title VII, alleging illegal reverse discrimination.
Mom wrote an opinion, joined by the late Judge Ferguson (whom we
loved and miss), upholding the Director’s decision. She wrote:
Statistics contained in the plan show that not one of the
Agency’s 238 skilled craft workers was a woman. . . . A plethora
of proof is hardly necessary to show that women are generally
underrepresented in such positions and that strong social
pressures weigh against their participation. The promotion of
Joyce was a lawful attempt to remedy the conspicuous
imbalance.7
After Joyce’s appointment as road dispatcher, 237 of the skilled craft
positions were filled by men. The 238th was filled by Joyce. I may not
be the most objective observer, but I find Mom’s opinion utterly
persuasive.
Here comes the good part. The Supreme Court affirmed. Justice
Brennan wrote for the Court:
The [Director’s] decision . . . was made pursuant to an
affirmative action plan that represents a moderate, flexible, caseby-case approach to effecting a gradual improvement in the
representation of minorities and women in the Agency’s work
force. Such a plan is fully consistent with Title VII, for it
embodies the contribution that voluntary employer action can
make in eliminating the vestiges of discrimination in the
workplace.8

6. 748 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1984), amended by 770 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1985).
7. Johnson, 770 F.2d at 758.
8. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 642 (1987).
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Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. With what
were to become two of his trademarks—sarcasm and insistence on text,
as he understands that text—Justice Scalia wrote, “With a clarity which,
had it not proved so unavailing, one might well recommend as a model
of statutory draftsmanship, Title VII . . . declares:” And then he quoted
Title VII.9
If you don’t mind a little singing10—“Those were the days my friend.
We thought they’d never end. We’d sing and dance forever and a day.”11
But the truth is, we knew they would end. Indeed, we knew they were
already ending. The Supreme Court affirmed Mom’s opinion in 1987.
Justice Scalia had been appointed and Justice Rehnquist had been
elevated to Chief Justice the year before. Justice Brennan would soon
retire. We could see the conservative majority coming.
There is a passage from Milton’s Paradise Lost that captures the
moment, one of Wordsworth’s favorite passages. Lucifer has been cast
out of heaven. He is now flying toward Eden. He is still far away, but he
is coming:
As when far off at sea a fleet descried
Hangs in the clouds, by equinoctial winds
Close sailing from Bengala . . . .
So seemed
Far off, the flying fiend.12
The next opinion, Thompson v. Calderon,13 is a particular sore point.
This was a capital case. Thomas Thompson and David Leitch were both
involved, in some way, with the stabbing death of Ginger Fleishli. There
was evidence from which a jury could have concluded that either
Thompson or Leitch killed her. The two men were tried separately. The
prosecutor tried Thompson first. His theory was that Thompson raped
her and then killed her to cover up the rape. The rape is what made
Thompson eligible for the death penalty. Thompson contended that they
had had consensual sex. The prosecutor presented two jailhouse snitches
who testified in support of the prosecutor’s theory. The jury convicted
Thompson and sentenced him to death.
Then the prosecutor tried Leitch. Now the prosecutor contended that
Leitch, rather than Thompson, killed Fleishli. Now the prosecutor’s
9. Id. at 657 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10. These lines were sung, though not very well.
11. MARY HOPKIN, THOSE WERE THE DAYS (Apple 1968).
12. JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST 63 (Philip Pullman ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2005) (1667).
13. 120 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
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theory was that Leitch killed her because she was interfering with his
attempted reconciliation with his ex-wife. He argued to the jury that
Leitch is “the only one with any motive for her death.”14 He presented
four jailhouse snitches to support this theory of the case. The jury
returned a verdict of second degree murder.
Obviously, the two theories of the case are incompatible. Yet the
prosecutor pursued them both, and got convictions under both.
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit denied habeas corpus to
Thompson. Because of administrative errors in two separate chambers,
no one made an en banc call. The mandate issued. Just before Thompson
was scheduled to be executed, the three-judge panel denied a motion to
recall the mandate. The full court then voted to take the case en banc.
The en banc court recalled the mandate. Mom wrote the opinion. She
wrote that there were “extraordinary” circumstances justifying the recall,
including the administrative errors that led to the failure to call the case
en banc, and “the grave questions that exist regarding Thompson’s
innocence of any capital offense, the likelihood that the [three-judge]
panel’s decision is erroneous, and the consequences that would flow
from allowing an erroneous decision to go unreviewed.”15 On the merits,
Mom wrote for the court that the prosecutor had acted improperly and
that Thompson’s counsel had provided ineffective assistance.
Here is where it gets bad. We are now in 1998, eleven years after the
Supreme Court’s affirmance in the Johnson case. The Supreme Court
reversed five-to-four, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy. He wrote that
recalling the mandate was a “grave abuse of discretion.”16 Not just an
abuse of discretion. A grave abuse of discretion. Those are strong words.
In my view the Supreme Court lost its sense of perspective. To state
the matter more plainly, the justices in the majority lost their temper.
The Court, of course, had had previous run-ins with the Ninth Circuit in
death penalty cases. The most famous of these was the Robert Alton
Harris case.17 And it would have more afterwards. But the Thompson
case stands out.

14. Id. at 1056 (emphasis in original).
15. Id. at 1051.
16. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 542 (1998).
17. In Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984), the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s grant
of habeas corpus. The Court later vacated several last-minute stays of execution. The Court’s last
order went so far as to forbid the entry of further stays. Vasquez v. Harris, 503 U.S. 1000 (1992);
see John T. Noonan, Op-Ed., Should State Executions Run on Schedule?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27,
1992, at A17.
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Death penalty cases are among the most difficult that any judge is
asked to decide. Of all cases, these should be the ones where our
judgment is brought to bear with calm deliberation, and where we seek
above all to ensure that we do not execute someone who is innocent, or,
more narrowly, as in the Thompson case, innocent of a capital crime. In
my view, the Ninth Circuit en banc panel in the Thompson case met that
high standard. I regret to say that I think that the Supreme Court did not.
Finally, a save-the-whales case. Most of you do not know that as a
young man Mom’s maternal grandfather shipped out from his hometown
of Mattapoisett, Massachusetts, for a two-year whaling voyage. I won’t
engage in deep psychological analysis, but it occurs to me to ask
whether Mom may be atoning for Grandpa Hammond’s whaling days.18
A year ago, Mom wrote a careful, forty-five-page opinion affirming
the district court’s preliminary injunction against the Navy conducting
exercises using sonar in a manner that caused serious damage to whales,
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Winter.19 She specifically
noted the district court’s “narrowly tailored mitigation measures which
provide that the Navy’s . . . exercises may proceed as planned if
conducted under circumstances that provide satisfactory safeguards for
the protection of the environment.”20
Here it comes again. The Supreme Court reversed, in a five-to-four
opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts. His opinion begins: “‘To be
prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.’
So said George Washington in his first Annual Address to Congress, 218
years ago. One of the most important ways the Navy prepares for war is
through integrated training exercises at sea.”21 You get the idea. In the
French phrase, “On s’en fiche”—which, roughly translated, means
“Damn the whales, full speed ahead.”
I have chosen these three opinions, partly to show Mom’s judicial
craft, partly to show her deep sense of humane justice, and partly to
show the different jurisprudential climate between the first, decided in
1984, and the last, decided in 2008. I have left out her other 700 or so
published opinions. In all of these opinions, Mom has tried not only to
do justice in the case before her, but also to shape the law to do justice in
the cases that will come after. It is by these opinions that the world will
judge her. But I ask you to remember the thousands and thousands of

18.
19.
20.
21.

THOMAS W. HAMMOND, ON BOARD A WHALER (1901).
518 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 703.
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 365, 370 (2008).
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invisible cases—remembered only by the parties—that Mom has also
decided.
It takes stamina to fight for law, and for real justice, in the waves of
cases that bring the “eternal note of sadness in,” day after day, week
after week, year after year. More than that, it takes courage. Courage to
follow the law as one sees it, and to try to do justice in this messy,
unhappy world.
There is an old Quaker saying, “Speak truth to power,” reminding us
of our obligation to speak truth to those who rule us. There is also a
reciprocal obligation. Power should speak truth to us. An appellate judge
is both powerless and powerful. She is told what to do by the Supreme
Court, and she tells others what to do. In both roles, she needs to speak
truth. For thirty years, Judge Betty Binns Fletcher has spoken the truth—
clearly, eloquently, and always fearlessly.

